http://www.google.com/press/new-approach-to-china/update.html
关于谷歌中国的最新声明
2010-03-23 David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer
今年1月12日，我们在本博客上宣布，Google及另外二十余家美国公司受到了来自中国的、复杂的网络攻击，在对这些攻击进 行深入调查的过程中，通过我们所收集到的证据表明，几十个与中国有关的人权人士的Gmail帐号定期受到第三方的侵入，而这大部分侵入是通过安装在他们电脑上的钓鱼软件或恶意软件进行的。这些攻击以及它们所暴露的网络审查问题，加上去年以来中国进一步限制网络言论自由，包括 对FaceBook、Twitter、YouTube、Google Docs 和 Blogger 等网站的持续屏蔽，使我们做出结论：我们不能继续在Google.cn搜索结果上进行自我审查。
从今天早上开始，我们已停止了在Google.cn搜索服务上的自我审查，包括 Google Search （网页搜索）、Google News（资讯搜索）和Google Images （图片搜索）。 访问 Google.cn 的用 户从现在开始将被指向Google.com.hk，在这个域名上，我们将提供未经审查的简体中文搜索结果，这些为中国大陆用户设计的服务将通过我们在香港的服务器实现。香港地区的用户还将继续通过Google.com.hk获得跟现在一样的、未经审查的繁体中文搜索服务。在我们进行迁移的过程中，由于香港服务器负荷的增加以及这些变化的复杂程度，用户可能会发现搜索速度变慢，或发现某些产品暂时不能访问。
实施我们做出的在Google.cn上停止审查搜索结果的承诺是一个十分艰难的过程。我们希望全球尽可能多的用户都能访问到我们的服务，包括在中国大陆的用户。中国政府在与我们讨论的过程中已经十分明确地表示，自我审查是一个不可谈判的法律要求。为此，我们相信，一个解决我们所面临挑战的可行方案是在Google.com.hk上提供未经审查的简体中文搜索结果——它完全符合法律要求，同时也有助于提高中国大陆用户对信息的访问。我们十分希望中国政府尊重我们的这一决定，尽管我们知道，用户对Google服务的访问有可能随时被阻止。为此，我们将密切监测网址访问问题，并制作了一个新页面，用户可以实时地了解到在中国哪些Google服务是可用的。
至于Google的广泛的业务运营，我们计划继续在中国的研发工作，并将保留销售团队，然而销售团队的规模显然部分取决于中国大陆用户能否访问Google.com.hk 。最后，我们要清楚表明：所有这些决定都是由美国的管理团队做出和实施的，没有任何一位中国员工能够、或者应该为这些决定负责。自我们在1月份发布博客以 来，尽管面临着众多的不确定性和困难，他们仍然坚守在工作岗位，专注于服务我们的中国用户和客户。我们为拥有这样的员工感到深深的骄傲。
©2010 Google
==========以下为之前Google官方的声明=========
http://www.google.com/press/new-approach-to-china/
A new approach to China
1/12/2010 03:00:00 PM
Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident–albeit a significant one–was something quite different.
First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users' computers.
We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this Report to Congress (PDF) by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (see p. 163-), as well as a related analysis (PDF) prepared for the Commission, Nart Villeneuve's blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China's economic reform programs and its citizens' entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that “we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.”
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
Posted by David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer